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The Exception That Swallows the Rule:
The Disparate Treatment of Federal Rule
of Evidence 804(b)(3) as Interpreted
in United States v. Williamson
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario: John, Bob, Stewart, and Sam are
all members of a drug conspiracy. Sam is arrested with a large amount
of heroin and enters into a plea agreement to testify against the others.
John and Stewart are subsequently arrested and elect to go to trial. Bob,
however, is nowhere to be found. The prosecutors who are trying the
cases against John and Stewart discover that Bob told a bartender that he
was leaving town. According to the bartender, Bob said that he, John,
Stewart, and Sam had been selling heroin, but the cops were closing in
on them. While the authorities search for Bob, the prosecutors attempt
to admit the bartender's testimony in order to incriminate John and
Stewart.
The bartender's testimony would clearly be hearsay.' In general,
the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit the admission of hearsay state-
ments into evidence.2 Bob's statement to the bartender, however, may
be admissible under an exception for statements made against one's
penal interest.' According to the Federal Rules of Evidence, hearsay is
admissible if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the statement
"at the time of its making ... so far tended to subject [the declarant] to
civil or criminal liability ... that a reasonable man in his position would
not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true."4 This
exception is rooted in the assumption that people do not make damaging
statements about themselves unless they believe the statements to be
true.5 Therefore, such statements against penal interest are deemed suf-
ficiently reliable to ease the regular concerns regarding hearsay
testimony.
The hearsay analysis becomes problematic with respect to Bob's
mention of John, Stewart, and Sam. While Bob's statement that he was
selling drugs is clearly against his penal interest, his statements that
1. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
2. FED. R. EvID. 802.
3. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
4. Id.
5. FED R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee note (citing Hileman v. Northwest Eng'g Co.,
346 F.2d 668 (6th Cir. 1965)).
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John, Stewart, and Sam were selling drugs are not necessarily against
Bob's interest. The statements implicating the others in Bob's drug
scheme are collateral to the statement against his interest. They are neu-
tral or possibly beneficial to Bob's interest. Thus, courts view such col-
lateral statements with suspicion.
Long before the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted, there
were differing opinions as to whether a hearsay exception for statements
against interest should exist. In fact, as late as the early twentieth cen-
tury, there was no such hearsay exception. As years went by, however,
the exception gained support and, in 1975, the hearsay exception for
statements against penal interest was included in the Federal Rules of
Evidence as Rule 804(b)(3).
Yet, even after Congress adopted it, Rule 804(b)(3) received varied
treatment by the federal courts with respect to collateral statements.
Some courts allowed into evidence entire narratives containing self-serv-
ing statements inculpating the accused, so long as the narrative as a
whole inculpated the declarant. Other courts excluded such collateral
self-serving statements, admitting only those collateral statements that
were disserving or neutral to the declarant's interest. Still, other courts
admitted only collateral, disserving statements and excluded collateral
statements that were self-serving or even neutral to the declarant's inter-
est. Thus, the lower courts exercised great discretion in admitting collat-
eral statements under the rule.
In 1994, the Supreme Court took it upon itself to resolve the dispa-
rate treatment of evidence under Rule 804(b)(3) by the lower courts. In
Williamson v. United States,6 the Supreme Court, in an opinion written
by Justice O'Connor, laid down what it figured to be a bright line rule
determining the scope of the exception for statements against interest.
Under Williamson, Bob's statements about John, Stewart, and Sam's
involvement in the drug sales are inadmissible.
Now, seven years later, it seems as though Bob's statements impli-
cating the others would probably be admitted in many federal courts,
despite the fact that Williamson has not been overturned. The question
remains, what happened to it? Apparently, some lower courts have sim-
ply disregarded it. Others have interpreted its language concerning
whether a collateral statement is truly self-incriminating very broadly.
Despite being controlling precedent handed down from the highest court
in the land, federal courts have treated Williamson with seemingly con-
scious disregard. The problem, however, lies deeper.
6. 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
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II. BACKGROUND
The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as "a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hear-
ing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."7 In
general, admission of hearsay statements into evidence is prohibited.8
Hearsay evidence is not subject to cross-examination and deprives the
fact finder of the opportunity to evaluate the perception, memory, and
veracity of the declarant.9 In short, hearsay evidence escapes institution-
alized procedures intended to ensure the reliability of evidence.
Yet some statements that are technically hearsay are admissible
where they "display indicia of reliability sufficient to overcome the nor-
mal dangers of admitting hearsay evidence."' One well-established
exception to the hearsay rule rooted in eighteenth century English com-
mon law allowed for admission of statements of facts against the declar-
ant's interest. I I It was widely held that for such statements to be
admissible they had to meet four requirements:
(1) the declarant must be dead; (2) the declaration must be against the
pecuniary or proprietary interest of the declarant; (3) the declaration
must be of a fact or facts which were immediately cognizable by the
declarant personally; and (4) the declarant must not have had a proba-
ble motive to falsify the fact declared.' 2
Until the twentieth century, the against interest hearsay exception was
not allowed for statements against penal interest.
Statements against penal interest were traditionally viewed as unre-
liable for three reasons. 13 First, the psychological premise, that a rea-
sonable person would not make a statement against his penal interest
unless the statement was true, is a generalization that may not apply to
certain "unreasonable" individuals. 14 Second, the declarant often has
reasons to lie or stretch truths. 5 For instance the declarant may be
attempting to curry favor with authorities, shift or share blame for a
7. FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
8. See FED. R. EVID. 802.
9. See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1362, at 3 (James H.
Chadbourn rev., 1974); see also Emily F. Duck, Note, The Williamson Standard for the Exception
to the Rule Against Hearsay Statements Against Penal Interest, 85 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY
1084, 1085 (1995).
10. Jay L. Hack, Note, Declarations Against Penal Interest, Standards of Admissibility Under
an Emerging Majority Rule, 56 B.U. L. REV. 148, 148 (1976).
11. See, e.g., Higham v. Ridgway, 103 Eng. Rep. 717 (K.B. 1808).
12. Bernard S. Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58
HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1944).
13. Andrew R. Keller, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest and the Confrontation
Clause, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 159, 163 (1983).
14. Id.
15. Id.
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crime, exact revenge, divert attention from himself, or even boast. 16
Finally, most statements inculpating a defendant are merely collateral
and rarely directly contrary to the declarant's own penal interest, further
weakening the reliability of the statement. 7
The hypothetical in the introduction illustrates this. Bob-is incul-
pated by saying that he was selling drugs and not by mentioning John,
Stewart, and Sam's involvement. The mention of the other players in
the scheme is merely collateral to Bob's inculpatory statement. The
prosecution will seek to admit this collateral statement into John and
Stewart's trials.
For these reasons, courts at common law were reluctant to admit
such statements against penal interest into evidence. 8 In fact, the
admission of these statements against penal interest was rejected in the
Sussex Peerage Case, which was recognized as controlling authority in
the courts of England.19 The United States Supreme Court later adopted
the English view in Donnelly v. United States.2 ° In his famous dissent,
Justice Holmes urged the use of common sense and logic, rather than
English precedent, to determine the admissibility of hearsay statements
against a declarant's penal interest. 2' Apparently, courts and legislators
took heed of Justice Holmes's words. In the years following Donnelly,
court decisions, statutes, and evidentiary rules began to allow for the
introduction of statements against penal interest.22
Finally, in 1975, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence,
and the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest was codi-
fied.23 Rule 804(b)(3) provides a hearsay exception for "a statement
which ...at the time of its making ...so far tended to subject the
declarant to . . . criminal liability ...that a reasonable person in the
declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing
16. Id. at 163-64.
17. Id.
18. Duck, supra note 9, at 1086; see also Keller, supra note 13, at 163-64.
19. 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (H.L. 1844).
20. 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913).
21. Justice Holmes stated:
The English cases since the separation of the two countries do not bind us; the
exception to the hearsay rule in the case of declarations against interest is well
known; no other statement is so much against interest as a confession of murder; it
is far more calculated to convince than dying declarations, which would be let in to
hang a man; and when we surround the accused with so many safeguards, some of
which to me seem excessive; I think we ought to give him a benefit of a fact that, if
proved, commonly would have such weight.
Id. at 277-78 (citation omitted).
22. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 1477, at 360 n.6-7.
23. For a discussion of the legislative history of the Federal Rules of Evidence, in particular
Rule 804(b)(3), see Duck, supra note 9, at 1086-88.
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it to be true."24 In 1978, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Alvarez,25
simply restated the rule as a three-part test to determine the admissibility
of hearsay statements under the exception. First, the declarant had to be
unavailable.26 Second, the statement had to subject the declarant to
criminal liability such that a reasonable person in the declarant's posi-
tion would not have made it unless it were believed to be true.27 Third,
the statement had to be corroborated by circumstances clearly indicating
its trustworthiness, but only if it is offered to exculpate the defendant.
28
Following the Fifth Circuit's decision in Alvarez, other circuits began to
apply the same three-part test. Some circuits even expanded the corrob-
oration requirement of the third prong to cover statements offered to
inculpate the defendant, even though Rule 804(b)(3) contains no such
requirement.29
Unfortunately, since the test mirrored Rule 804(b)(3), it ignored the
greatest problem with this exception. Hearsay statements in this context
that are offered to either inculpate or exculpate a defendant are usually
collateral to the statement against the declarant's interest. In fact, such
statements are usually neutral, or even favorable, to the declarant's inter-
est. The text of Rule 804(b)(3), however, is silent with regard to collat-
eral statements.3 ° Thus, a problem arises when a declarant gives a
statement that is generally against his penal interest yet contains collat-
eral remarks inculpating the defendant.
This problem is hardly new and over the years there have tradition-
ally been three approaches. The first approach was offered by John
Henry Wigmore, who felt that in such circumstances the entire statement
should be admitted.3' He reasoned that if a "statement is made under
circumstances fairly indicating the declarant's sincerity and accuracy, it
is obvious that the situation indicates the correctness of whatever he may
say under that influence. '"32 Thus, "the statement may be accepted, not
merely as to the specific fact against interest, but also as to every fact
contained in the same statement. ' 33 Using the hypothetical to illustrate
Wigmore's approach Bob told the bartender that he had been commit-
ting an illegal act by selling drugs. According to Wigmore, Bob would
24. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
25. 584 F.2d 694, 699 (5th Cir. 1978).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 626 F.2d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1383 (8th Cir. 1981).
30. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
31. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 1465, at 339.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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not have related this information to the bartender had it not been true.
Thus, Bob was in a truthful state of mind so his statement implicating
John, Stewart, and Sam in the drug ring must be equally reliable and
therefore admissible.
The second view, that of Charles T. McCormick, is more guarded
concerning the admission collateral statements. He believed that the
nature of the collateral statements themselves should be taken into
account.34 Those collateral statements that are disserving or neutral as
to the declarant's interest should be admitted.3 5 Those that are of a self-
serving nature should be excluded.36 Under this approach, the focus
would be on the circumstances surrounding Bob's implication of the
others in the drug ring. If circumstances indicate that Bob mentioned
the others for a self-serving purpose, then the collateral statements
would be inadmissible because Bob could have lied. If it is shown,
however, that Bob had nothing to gain by implicating the others, or that
the collateral statements were actually disserving, then the full statement
would be admissible.
Bernard S. Jefferson advanced the third and narrowest approach. 37
Namely, that the use of statements against interest should be confined
"to the proof of the fact which is against interest. '38 Disagreeing with
the Model Code of Evidence "that a declaration against interest involves
a truth-telling frame of mind" affecting all statements contained therein,
Jefferson claimed that "the presence of the declaration against interest
does not add to the trustworthiness of neutral and self-serving state-
ments."' 39 Thus, only the statements directly counter to the declarant's
penal interest would be admissible. To use Bob's statement again, it is
clear that his mention of John, Stewart, and Sam is not directly counter
to Bob's self-interest. Thus, reference to the others would be redacted,
if possible, or the entire statement could be deemed inadmissible.
While generally rejecting Wigmore's view that obviously self-serv-
ing statements were held inadmissible, n° the federal courts were far from
uniform in their approaches. The Second Circuit, in United States v.
Garris,4' adopted a sufficiently integrated test, rejecting the argument
34. See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 256 (1954).
35. Id. at 553.
36. Id.
37. Jefferson, supra note 12, at 57-63.
38. Id. at 62-63.
39. Id. at 62.
40. See, e.g., United Sates v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 252 (1st Cir. 1976) (stating that the court
did "not read [Rule 804(b)(3)] as incorporating the rather broad formulation put forth by
Wigmore, who saw the against-interest exception as permitting reception not only of the 'specific
fact against interest, but also ... every fact contained in the same statement."').
41. 616 F.2d 626, 630 (2d Cir. 1980).
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that a remark taken out of a self-inculpatory declaration and standing
alone must be against the declarant's interest to be admitted. According
to the Garris court, "it suffices for admission under [Rule 804(b)(3)] that
a remark which is itself neutral as to the declarant's interest be integral
to a larger statement which is against the declarant's interest. '4 2 In fact,
the Second Circuit's approach was strikingly similar to that of Wigmore.
United States v. Lieberman followed the Garris court's lead.43 In a
case involving a conspiracy to sell marijuana, the Second Circuit held
that the declarant's statement that he packaged dishpacks was clearly
self-incriminating and admissible because the dishpacks contained mari-
juana.44 The same declarant made a second statement that the defendant
told him not to open the door for anyone, and this was also held to be
self-incriminating, "since it was probative of [the declarant's] knowl-
edge of the furtive nature of his activities. ' 45 The court, however, went
further by stating that even if the second statement had been completely
neutral, "it could constitute a statement against interest within the mean-
ing of Rule 804(b)(3) since it was part and parcel of a larger conversa-
tion in which clearly self-incriminating statements were made."46
In yet another Second Circuit case, the court admitted a declarant's
statement that he was dealing drugs with the defendant. Reasoning that
the reference to the declarant's drug dealing was closely linked to the
defendant's drug dealing, the court claimed that "the admission of the
entire statement was clearly proper. '47  It is interesting to note that,
while these cases all share a "Wigmorean" approach to collateral state-
ments, none actually cite to him to support the proposition.
By contrast, other circuits have adopted Jefferson's narrower inter-
pretation of Rule 804(b)(3). 4 8 United States v. Lilley involved a prose-
cution for forging a signature on an income tax refund.4 9 Mrs. Lilley,
the defendant, was implicated by her husband's statement admitting the
forgery.5" The Eighth Circuit held that "the small portion of Mr. Lil-
42. Id.
43. 637 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1980).
44. Id. at 103.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1171 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Admitting the entire
statement even though it contains a reference to others is particularly appropriate when that
reference is closely connected to the reference to the declarant."). Contra United States v.
Williams, 927 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1991) (admitting guilty pleas of coconspirators in a drug case
under Rule 804(b)(3) only after all references to the defendants were severed and excluded).
48. See United States v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1978). "To the extent that a statement
is not against the declarant's interest, the guaranty of trustworthiness does not exist and that
portion of the statement should be excluded." Id. at 188.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 186.
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ley's statement which was against his interest should have been
excluded absent severability from those portions of the statement incul-
pating the accused."'" This approach is directly counter to the "substan-
tially integral" test in that it does not admit a declarant's inculpatory
statements that include non-severable, collateral, neutral statements
inculpating the defendant.
The Eighth Circuit received support when the Tenth Circuit later
adopted the Lilley approach and held that "to the extent that a statement
not against a declarant's interest is severable from other statements satis-
fying Rule 804(b)(3) ...such statement should be excluded."52 The
Tenth Circuit was unclear, however, as to whether such statements
would be admissible if they were not severable. 53 Responding to the
conflict among the lower federal circuits, in 1994 the United States
Supreme Court accepted the opportunity to clear up the question of
whether collateral statements are admissible under Rule 804(b)(3), and
attempted to fashion a bright line rule.54
III. WILLIAMSON V. UNITED STATES
A. Facts
While driving through Georgia, Reginald Harris was stopped by a
deputy sheriff for weaving on the highway. After Harris consented to
a search of his vehicle, the deputy found nineteen kilograms of cocaine
in two suitcases in the trunk and arrested Harris.56 Shortly after his
arrest, Harris was questioned by Special Agent Donald Walton of the
Drug Enforcement Agency.57 Harris claimed that he received the
cocaine from an unidentified person in Fort Lauderdale and that he was
to deliver it that night to a dumpster where it was to be picked up by
Fredel Williamson, the owner of the cocaine.58 When Walton informed
Harris that he had arranged for a controlled delivery of the drugs, Harris
suddenly changed his story.59
According to Harris's new story, he was transporting the cocaine to
51. Id. at 188.
52. United States v. Porter, 881 F.2d 878, 883 (10th Cir. 1989).
53. Id.
54. Williamson v. United States, 510 U.S. 1039 (1994) (granting certorari); For reported
opinion following hearing, see Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
55. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 596.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. In addition, other evidence further supported Williamson's connection to Harris: the
two suitcases bore the initials of Williamson's sister; Williamson was listed as a driver on the car
rental agreement; in the glove compartment were an envelope addressed to Williamson and a
receipt bearing the address of Williamson's girlfriend were in the glove compartment. Id.
59. Id. at 596-97.
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Atlanta for Williamson, and Williamson was riding in another car in
front of him when he was pulled over.60 Harris claimed that Williamson
noticed that he had been stopped, turned around and drove past the loca-
tion of the stop, and saw the open trunk.6' Thus, Williamson knew that
the police had found the cocaine and that a controlled delivery by the
government was now impossible.62
Harris told Agent Walton that he had lied to Walton earlier because
of his fear of Williamson. 63 While he freely implicated himself, Harris
refused to have his story recorded, or even sign a written version of his
statement.64 Although Walton promised to report any cooperation to the
Assistant United States Attorney, he subsequently testified that he did
not promise Harris any reward or other benefit for cooperating. 65  At
Williamson's trial, Harris was called to court but refused to testify
despite an offer of use immunity from the prosecution and court order.
He was eventually held in contempt. 66  As a result, the district court
deemed Harris unavailable and admitted Walton's testimony as to Har-
ris's statements under Rule 804(b)(3).6 7
Williamson was eventually convicted of possessing cocaine with
intent to distribute, conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to dis-
tribute, and traveling interstate to promote the distribution of cocaine.68
Williamson appealed his conviction, claiming the admission of Harris's
statements violated Rule 804(b)(3).69 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
without opinion,7" and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.7 The
Supreme Court unanimously vacated the Eleventh Circuit's order admit-
ting all of Harris's hearsay statements and remanded the case for further
60. Id. at 597.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. The Supreme Court quoted the district court's ruling:
The ruling of the Court is that the statements . . . are admissible under [Rule
804(b)(3)], which deals with statements against interest. First, defendant Harris's
statements clearly implicated himself, and therefore, are against his penal interest.
Second, defendant Harris, the declarant, is unavailable. And third, as I found
yesterday, there are sufficient corroborating circumstances in this case to ensure the
trustworthiness of his testimony. Therefore these statements by defendant Harris
implicating [Williamson] are admissible.
Id. at 597-98 (citing United States v. Harrell, 788 F.2d 1524 (11 th Cir. 1986)).
68. Id. at 597.
69. Id. at 598. Williamson also claimed that the admission of Harris's statements violated the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Id.
70. United States v. Williamson, 981 F.2d 1262 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (per curium).
71. Williamson v. United States, 510 U.S. 1039 (1994).
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proceedings.72 The Justices disagreed, however, on the test to determine
the scope of Rule 804(b)(3) regarding the admissibility of collateral
statements and on how such a test should be applied to the facts of the
case.
73
B. Justice O'Connor's Opinion
In the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor concluded that "collat-
eral statements, even ones that are neutral as to interest. . ., should [not]
be treated any differently from other hearsay statements that are gener-
ally excluded. '7 4 According to Justice O'Connor's narrow interpreta-
tion, "the most faithful reading of Rule 804(b)(3) is that it does not allow
admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they are made
within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory." 75 Thus, the
question is whether each individual statement, viewed in light of all sur-
rounding circumstances, is "sufficiently against the declarant's penal
interest 'that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not
have made the statement unless believing it to be true."' 76
Justice O'Connor arrived at her conclusion by first having deter-
mined what the rule means by "statement."77 After reviewing several
definitions of the word, Jusitice O'Connor decided that the principle
behind the rule that reasonable people would not make self-inclupatory
statements unless the statements were true, required a narrow interpreta-
tion.78 Justice O'Connor acknowledged that "one of the most effective
ways to lie is to mix falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems
particularly persuasive because of its self-inculpatory nature."79 Thus,
in such an instance, admitting the entire narrative would admit false
statements.
Justice Kennedy, however, pointed to the Advisory Committee's
Note to Rule 804(b)(3) as endorsing his position that non-self-inculpa-
tory parts of a narrative may be admissible if the entire narrative is self-
72. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 605.
73. The Court issued four opinions. Justice O'Connor announced the judgement of the Court
and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, I-A, and 1I-B, in which Justices
Blackmun, Stevens, Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg joined, and an opinion with respect to Part II-C,
in which Justice Scalia joined. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion. Justice Ginsburg filed an
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Blackmun, Stevens
and Souter joined. Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined. Id. at 594-95.
74. Id. at 600.
75. Id. at 600-01.
76. Id. at 603-04 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)).
77. Id. at 599-600.
78. Id. at 599.
79. Id. at 599-600.
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inculpatory in the aggregate.8" In rejecting Kennedy's argument, Justice
O'Connor found that the language of the advisory committee note was
"not particularly clear," and concluded that "the policy expressed in the
Rule's text points clearly enough in one direction that it outweighs
whatever force the Notes may have."8
Justice O'Connor rebutted another attack by Justice Kennedy in
Part 11-B of the Court's opinion. She disagreed with Justice Kennedy's
claim that the narrow rule interpretation would deprive Rule 804(b)(3)
of any meaningful effect.82 To illustrate her point, Justice O'Connor
gave examples of how the Rule would still be able to have its desired
effect. For instance, the statement, "Yes, I killed X," would be admissi-
ble if the defendant was being tried as an accomplice to the murder.83
She also pointed out that a declarant's statement that he robbed a bank
on Friday morning could be admitted and coupled with other direct testi-
mony that the accused was seen with the declarant on Friday morning.84
Justice O'Connor went even further, stating that "[e]ven [collateral]
statements that are on their face neutral may actually be against the
declarant's interest. ' 85 For instance, "I hid the gun in Joe's apartment"
would be self-inculpatory if it helps the police to find a murder
weapon.86 Moreover, Justice O'Connor claimed that the statement,
"Sam and I went to Joe's house," could conceivably be admissible "if a
reasonable person in the declarant's shoes would realize that being
linked to Joe and Sam would implicate the declarant in Joe and Sam's
conspiracy. 87 It will become apparent that these words sowed the seeds
80. Id. at 614. The Advisory Committee Notes read, in relevant part:
[T]he third-party confession ... may include statements implicating [the accused],
and under the general theory of declarations against interest they would be
admissible as related statements. . . . by no means require that all statements
implicating another person be excluded from the category of declarations against
interest. Whether a statement in fact is against interest must be determined by the
circumstances of each case. Thus a statement admitting guilt and implicating
another person, made while in custody, may well be motivated by a desire to curry
favor with the authorities and hence fail to qualify as against interest .... On the
other hand the same words spoken under different circumstances, e.g., to an
acquaintance, would have no difficulty in qualifying....
'The balancing of self-serving against dissenting [sic] aspects of a declaration is
discussed in McCormick §256.
Id. at 601-02 (citing Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Bruton v. United States, 319 U.S.
123 (1968)).
81. Id. at 602.
82. Id. at 602-03.
83. Id. at 603.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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of Williamson's own self-destruction.
In Part II-C of her opinion, which only Justice Scalia joined, Justice
O'Connor concluded that some of Harris's statements, those inculpating
only himself, would clearly have been admissible.88 She was more
skeptical, however, of those parts of Harris's confession implicating
Williamson since they did not really subject Harris to any criminal lia-
bility.89 In fact, a reasonable person in Harris's position might have
even believe that implicating Williamson would be beneficial.9" As a
caveat, Justice O'Connor again emphasized that "this can be a fact-
intensive inquiry, which would require careful examination of all the
circumstances surrounding the criminal activity involved."91 Thus, the
court remanded the case to the Eleventh Circuit with directions to con-
duct the inquiry.92
C. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia generally agreed with Jus-
tice O'Connor. 93 He referred to the terms, "collateral neutral" and "col-
lateral self-serving," as "manufactured categories" and concluded that
the relevant inquiry "must always be whether the particular remark at
issue (and not the extended narrative) meets the standard set forth in the
Rule." '94 Predictably, Justice Scalia looked strictly to the text of Rule
804(b)(3) for guidance in reaching his conclusion.95 Giving the example
of a declarant implicating himself in a conspiracy, he also noted that a
declarant's statement is not automatically inadmissible simply because it
names or implicates another person.9 6 Similarly, Justice Scalia claimed
that admissible statements are not necessarily confined to the confession
of a crime, but they may also include a description of events leading up
to the crime.97
88. Id. at 604. "[F]or instance, when he said he knew there was cocaine in the suitcase, he
essentially forfeited his only possible defense to a charge of cocaine possession, lack of
knowledge." Id.
89. Id.
90. "Small fish in a big conspiracy often get shorter sentences than people who are running
the whole show, especially if the small fish are willing to help the authorities catch the big ones."
Id. (citation omitted).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 605.
94. Id. at 607.
95. Id. at 605-06. "[T]he relevant inquiry must always be, as the text directs, whether the
statement 'at the time of its making . . . so far tended to subject the declarant to . . . criminal
liability ... that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement
unless believing it to be true."' Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)).
96. Id. at 606-07.
97. Id. at 606. Justice Scalia's example is as follows:
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D. Justice Ginsburg's Concurrence
Like Justice Scalia, Justice Ginsburg agreed with the Court that
Rule 804(b)(3) "excepts from the general rule that hearsay statements
are inadmissible only 'those declarations or remarks within [a narrative]
that are individually self-inculpatory."' 98 Her main concern was the rec-
ognition of the untrustworthiness of statements implicating others, since
"[a] person arrested in incriminating circumstances has a strong incen-
tive to shift blame or downplay his role in comparison to others .... 99
Justice Ginsburg's disagreement with Justice O'Connor comes from
Ginsburg's belief that "Harris's arguably inculpatory statements are too
closely intertwined with his self-serving declarations to be ranked as
trustworthy." 100
For instance, Justice Ginsburg argued that Harris's acknowledg-
ment of the drugs was not in fact against his penal interest.' 0 ' Since
Harris was caught red-handed with nineteen kilos of cocaine, denying
existence of the cocaine would have been futile.'0 2 Instead, Harris
claimed that he was merely transporting the drugs for the owner, who he
identified as Williamson, thus decreasing Harris's role and shifting
blame.'0 3 Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that although Har-
ris recanted his first story and admitted that he had lied, his second story
still painted Williamson as the "big fish."' 1
While Justice Ginsburg admitted that Harris's statements were
incriminating, in her opinion they were only marginally so.105 Accord-
ing to Justice Ginsburg, "[t]hey project[ed] an image of a person acting
not against his penal interest but striving mightily to shift principal
responsibility to someone else."'0 6 Thus, she concluded that she would
hold none of Harris's hearsay statements admissible under Rule
Consider for example a declarant who stated: "On Friday morning I went into a
gunshop [sic] and (lawfully) bought a particular type of handgun and a particular
type of ammunition. I then drove my 1958 blue Edsel and parked in front of the
First City Bank with the keys in the ignition and the driver's door ajar. I then went
inside, robbed the bank, and shot the security guard." Although the declarant has not
confessed to any element of a crime in the first two sentences, those statements in
context are obviously against his penal interest, and I have no doubt that a trial
judge could properly admit them.
Id.
98. Id. at 607.
99. Id. at 607-08.
100. Id. at 608.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 609.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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804(b)(3).' 0 7
E. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy agreed with the judgment of the Court and the
concurrences regarding the rationale behind Rule 804(b)(3).' 0 8 He dis-
agreed, however, with the Court's interpretation of the rule with respect
to the treatment of collateral statements.10 9 Noting the Rule's silence on
the issue of collateral statements, Justice Kennedy was the only Justice
to examine how legal scholars have historically approached the issue.l"°
After discussing the three different approaches of Wigmore, McCor-
mick, and Jefferson, Justice Kennedy noted that the Court took an
extreme approach in adopting Jefferson's opinion that no collateral
statements should be admissible under Rule 804(b)(3)."'
As he understood the Court's reasoning, the basis for its decision
not to admit any collateral statements was merely the Rule's silence on
the issue.'" Because the Rule does not speak to the issue, Congress
must not have meant to include collateral statements given the underly-
ing principle behind Rule 803(b)(3) is that reasonable people do not
make statements against their interest unless they are telling the truth." 3
As Justice Kennedy pointed out, the underlying principle has not
resolved the debate over the issue. 1 4 In fact, contrary to the Court's
opinion, "to the extent the authorities come to any close consensus, they
support the admission of some collateral statements." '" 5 Therefore, it is
incorrect to assume that the Rule's silence actually incorporates any one
approach.' 16
Justice Kennedy looked to three sources other than the text of Rule
itself to conclude that Rule 804(b)(3) allows the admission of some col-
lateral statements. 1 7 First, Justice Kennedy claimed that, absent gui-
dance from Congress, the Court should assume that Congress intended
the Federal Rules of Evidence to be applied consistent with their appli-
107. Id. at 610. Justice Ginsburg did add that because she had not reviewed the entire trial
court record, she was unable to determine whether the erroneous admission of the hearsay
evidence constituted harmless error. Thus, she agreed with the Court's decision to vacate and
remand the case to the Eleventh Circuit. Id.
108. Id. at 611.
109. Id. at 613.
110. See id. at 611-13.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 612-13.
113. Id. at 613.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 613-14. "The Rule's silence no more incorporates Jefferson's position respecting
collateral statements than it does McCormick's or Wigmore's." Id. at 613.
117. See id. at 614-17.
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cation at common law." 8 Interestingly, Justice Kennedy quoted Jeffer-
son, the leading proponent of the approach excluding all collateral
statements, who wrote, "[f]rom the very beginning of this exception, it
has been held that a declaration against interest is admissible, not only to
prove the disserving fact stated, but also to prove other facts contained
in collateral statements connected with the disserving statement."'' 9
Noting that Congress legislated against a common law background, Jus-
tice Kennedy "would not assume that Congress gave the common-law
rule a silent burial in Rule 804(b)(3). 12 °
Second, he looked to the Advisory Committee's Note which states,
"ordinarily, the third-party confession is thought of in terms of exculpat-
ing the accused, but this is by no means always or necessarily the case: it
may include statements implicating him, and under the general theory of
declarations against interest they would be admissible as related state-
ments. "121 According to Justice Kennedy, this language is a "forthright
statement that collateral statements are admissible under Rule
804(b)(3)."'' 2 2 In fact, the Advisory Committee's Note makes mention
of McCormick's balancing approach. 23  Justice Kennedy concluded
that, given the Rule's silence on the issue, the Court should follow the
guidance from the Advisory Committee's Note.'
2 4
Finally, Justice Kennedy noted the general assumption exists that
Congress would not enact a statute unless they intended it to have a
meaningful effect.' 25 Commentators have recognized that most state-
ments inculpating a defendant are collateral to those against the declar-
ant's interest, and the exclusion of collateral statements would exclude
most inculpatory statements. 126 Thus, "the conclusion that no collateral
statements are admissible-the conclusion reached by the Court today-
would 'eviscerate the against penal interest exception.""127 Although
118. Id. at 615.
119. Id. (citing Jefferson, supra note 12, at 57).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 614.
122. Id.
123. "The balancing of self-serving against disserving aspects of a declaration is discussed in
McCormick § 256." FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee note (citing MCCORMICK, supra
note 34, § 256).
124. "When as here the text of a Rule of Evidence does not answer a question that must be
answered in order to apply the Rule, and when the Advisory Committee's Note does answer the
question, our practice indicates that we should pay attention to the Advisory Committee's Note.
We have referred often to those Notes in interpreting the Rules of Evidence, and I see no reason to
jettison that practice here." Williamson, 512 U.S..at 614-15.
125. Id. at 616.
126. Id.
127. Id. (quoting Michael D. Bergeisen, Comment, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and
Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest, 66 CAL. L. Rev. 1189, 1207 (1978)).
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Justice Kennedy conceded that there are some situations where Rule
803(b)(3) under Justice O'Connor's interpretation would apply, it would
be rare that the declarant's actual self-inculpatory words would also
inculpate the defendant. 128 Justice Kennedy stated that he "would not
presume that Congress intended the penal interest exception to the Rule
to have so little effect with respect to statements that inculpate the
accused." 129
While Justice Kennedy would hold that collateral statements are
admissible under Rule 804(b)(3), he was careful to point out that not all
collateral statements would be admissible. 130 Justice Kennedy's opin-
ion, by reference to McCormick, was that the Advisory Committee's
Note incorporated McCormick's middle-of-the-road approach, which
"contemplates exclusion of a collateral self-serving statement [where
severable from disserving ones], but admission of a collateral neutral
statement." 13
To illustrate the point, Justice Kennedy gave an example in which
two masked gunmen rob a bank and one shoots a teller. 132 If one of the
robbers confesses but claims that the other robber was the triggerman,
then that would be an instance of a self-serving statement that would be
inadmissible. 33 If the same gunman, however, merely claims that he
and the other robber robbed the bank together, then the statement would
be considered a neutral collateral statement rather than self-serving. 3
4
Justice Kennedy noted a further limitation on statements given to
authorities, since "[a] declarant may believe that a statement of guilt to
authorities is in his interest to some extent." 35 In fact, the Advisory
Committee's Note realized this possibility and cautioned courts to
examine whether the circumstances indicate that "the statement was
'motivated by a desire to curry favor with the authorities." 36 In fact,
the note seems to be "consistent with McCormick's recognition that
'even though a declaration may be against interest in one respect, if it
appears that the declarant had some other motive whether of self-interest
or otherwise, which was likely to lead him to misrepresent the facts, the
declaration will be excluded."' ' 37 Thus, Justice Kennedy's reliance on
McCormick's approach in interpreting Rule 804(b)(3) is strengthened.
128. Id. at 617.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 617-21.
131. Id. at 617-18.
132. Id. at 618.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 619.
136. Id. (quoting FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee note).
137. Id. (quoting MCCORMICK, supra note 34, § 256, at 553).
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In conclusion, Justice Kennedy suggested the following procedure
to determine the admissibility of statements against penal interest that
inculpate the accused. A court should first make an initial determination
as to whether a statement "contained a fact against penal interest." '138
Should the statement contain such a fact, "the court should admit all
statements related to the precise statement against penal interest, subject
to two limits."'1 39 First, "the court should exclude a collateral statement
that is so self-serving as to render it unreliable."' 4 ° Second, if the
declarant made the statement under circumstances in which he had a
"significant motivation to obtain favorable treatment, as when the gov-
ernment made an explicit offer of leniency in exchange for the declar-
ant's admission of guilt, the entire statement should be inadmissible."''
Justice Kennedy further added that since this approach requires a fact
intensive determination, trial court judges should be given "wide discre-
tion to examine a particular statement to determine whether all or part of
it should be admitted."' 142
IV. FEDERAL TREATMENT OF WILLIAMSON
Shortly after Williamson, lower federal courts began to apply the
new test. In some instances, like United States v. Hazelett,i 43 applica-
tion of the new standard for admissibility of collateral statements was
easy. Hazelett involved facts almost identical to those in Williamson.
Theresa King was travelling by bus from Los Angeles to St. Louis. Dur-
ing a routine stop in Springfield, Missouri a Drug Enforcement Agency
agent boarded the bus momentarily, began speaking with King, and
eventually requested to search her bag. King consented to the search
and the agent found two kilograms of cocaine. King confessed that a
man named Ricky in Los Angeles had given her money to transport the
cocaine to St. Louis where she was to call a phone number and arrange
for the package to be picked up at the St. Louis bus station. The authori-
ties conducted a controlled delivery in St. Louis and apprehended Ricky
Hazelett. King was subsequently released on her own recognizance and
was never seen again. At Hazelett's trial, the court allowed the prosecu-
tion to admit King's hearsay statements inculpating Hazelett under Rule
804(b)(3). Hazelett was convicted of possessing more than 500 grams
of cocaine with intent to distribute and subsequently appealed.' 44
138. Id. at 620.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 621.
143. 32 F.3d 1313 (8th Cir. 1994).
144. Id. at 1314-16.
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Citing the Supreme Court's opinion in Williamson, as well as Jus-
tice Ginsburg's concurrence, the Eighth Circuit noted the similarities
between the two cases.' 4 5 Like Harris, King made her statements after
she was caught with two kilograms of cocaine.' 4 6 "Once those drugs
were discovered, . . .she had nothing to lose by confessing, and she
certainly had nothing to lose by implicating another person, particularly
someone more culpable."' 14 7 Consequently, the Court held that "King's
statements implicating Hazelett were not sufficiently against her interest,
[and] they were not admissible under Rule 804(b)(3)."' 48
The Eighth Circuit correctly applied Williamson again in United
States v. Mendoza.'49 In that case, Martha Wheeler, the declarant, was
arrested for selling methamphetamine and agreed to cooperate with the
authorities.15 0 She subsequently implicated Cirilo Mendoza, the defen-
dant, in the scheme.' 5 ' In affirming the district courts exclusion of
Wheeler's hearsay statements implicating Mendoza, the Eight Circuit
noted, "Wheeler agreed to cooperate with authorities after she was
caught red-handed with $16,000 in drug money .... At that point, she
had nothing to lose by implicating him. Moreover, she may reasonably
have believed that by implicating Mendoza she would curry favor with
the authorities and lessen her own punishment."' 52
Considering the Eighth Circuit's narrow approach to Rule
804(b)(3) prior to Williamson,'53 it is no surprise that Hazelett and Men-
doza fall right in line. Furthermore, these were fairly easy calls. The
thrust of Williamson was to narrow the scope of the Rule 804(b)(3) hear-
say exception. Any court would be hard pressed to justify statements
with such strong self-serving qualities as those in Hazelett and Mendoza.
The true effects of Williamson would be felt when a declarant's collat-
eral statement inculpates an accused and the collateral statement is not
obviously self-serving. In such instances, under Williamson, the collat-
eral statement should be excluded. This not always the case.
For instance, in United States v. Barone, 54 the First Circuit
employed the language of Williamson to admit collateral hearsay state-
ments implicating the defendant in a RICO conspiracy. The government
145. Id. at 1318-19.
146. Id. at 1318.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1319.
149. 85 F.3d 1347 (8th Cir. 1996).
150. Id. at 1348-49.
151. Id. at 1349.
152. Id. at 1352 (citing Williamson v. United States 512 U.S. 594, 608 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.
concurring)).
153. See United States v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1978).
154. 114 F.3d 1284 (1st Cir. 1997).
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sought to introduce statements made to his sister and cousin by Jimmy
Limoli, a deceased declarant. 55 Limoli's statements, while generally
self-inculpatory, contained numerous collateral statements implicating
Pasquale "Patsy" Barone in two murders connected to racketeering oper-
ations.' 56 Barone claimed that the statements were inadmissible under
Williamson because they were not individually self-inculpatory. 57
The First Circuit disagreed with "Barone's contention that William-
son create[d] a per se bar to any and all statements against interest that
also implicate another." ' 8 The court first noted that a "statement
against penal interest is not rendered inadmissible 'merely because the
declarant names another person or implicates a possible codefend-
ant."' 59 For further support, the Court pointed out that Williamson
"used as an example of an admissible statement against penal interest
'Sam and I went to Joe's house,"' 1 60 where "a reasonable person in the
declarant's shoes would realize that being linked to Joe and Sam would
implicate the declarant in Joe and Sam's conspiracy." 161
While this would have been enough to admit Limoli's statements,
the court went further by analyzing the statements under a totality of
circumstances test and found that "none of the challenged testimony
shifts blame or exculpates" Limoli. 162 Furthermore, the court found
Limoli's statements to be even more trustworthy given "the fact that the
statements were not made to law enforcement officials in a custodial
setting, as in Williamson . . ., but to close relatives of the declarant.' ' 63
Thus, the First Circuit applied the test set forth in Williamson, but con-
travened the intent of the Supreme Court by expanding its purposefully
drawn narrow scope. 164
155. Id. at 1289-91.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1291.
158. Id. at 1295.
159. Id.
160. Id. (quoting Williamson, 512 U.S. at 603).
161. Id. at 1295, n.5 (quoting Williamson, 512 U.S. at 603).
162. Id. at 1296. The First Circuit supports the totality of the circumstances test by pointing out
that Williamson requires that a court look at the context and all surrounding circumstances in
making a determination of admissibility. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 603-04.
163. Barone, 114 F.3d at 1296.
164. Other Courts have used similar conspiracy cases in the same way. For instance, in United
States v. Moses, 148 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 1998), the defendant was receiving kickbacks from
Gaudelli, the declarant. The court could have stopped after admitting Gaudelli's hearsay
statements implicating Moses in the kickback conspiracy stating, "[B]y naming Moses, as well as
the place where he was meeting Moses to make payments, Gaudelli provided self-inculpatory
information." Id. at 280-81. But, the Third Circuit further noted that "in the instant case, by
contrast [to Williamson], Gaudelli made his statements to a friend during lunch conversations that
took place long before Gaudelli was arrested. Under these circumstances, there is no reason to
believe that Gaudelli was trying to avoid criminal consequences by passing blame to Moses." Id.
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The Second Circuit is equally culpable. For example, in United
States v. Sasso,165 the court admitted collateral statements by a declar-
ant, Armienti, who was involved in a gun-running conspiracy with the
defendant. In reaching this conclusion, the court incorrectly relied on a
totality of the circumstances test to determine the reliability of
Armienti's statements. 166 First, the court noted that "Armienti's state-
ments inculpating Sasso equally inculpated Armienti himself in the gun-
running conspiracy."'' 67 Second, the court claimed that there was no rea-
son for Armienti "to falsely bring Sasso into the picture."'
' 68
Conspiracy cases like Barone and Sasso are prime examples of how
collateral statements inculpating defendants are admissible. They are
admissible because the mention of the defendant is the thing that incul-
pates the declarant. Under such reasoning, however, collateral state-
ments will nearly always be admissible in conspiracy cases.
Furthermore, anytime a declarant inculpates himself as well as a defen-
dant in the same crime, a conspiracy can be found. Thus, such state-
ments will always fall under the exception and the exception will
swallow the rule.
Part II-B of Justice O'Connor's opinion sowed the seeds of such
abuse by containing a conspiracy example. In fact, this example is quite
perplexing. Justice O'Connor seemingly desired to lay down a bright
line rule. Yet, she asserted that the statement, "Sam and I went to Joe's
house," could be admissible "if a reasonable person in the declarant's
shoes would realize that being linked to Joe and Sam would implicate
the declarant in Joe and Sam's conspiracy."1 69 In order to ascertain
whether such a statement is truly self-inculpatory, a judge would have to
look at the surrounding circumstances. Looking beyond the actual state-
ment defeats the goal of having a bright line rule.
The expansion of the breadth of Williamson does not end with the
conspiracy example as lower courts have managed to find even more
fodder in Part II-B.1 7 ° For instance, the Fourth Circuit deemed the fol-
See also United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 415 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting for support Justice
Scalia's concurrence in Williamson regarding the admissibility of statements by a lieutenant in an
organized crime organization that describe the organizations inner workings and names other
actors/members); United States v. Briones, Nos. 97-10369, 97-10370, 97-10371, 97-10372, 1998
WL 863026, at *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 30, 1998) (admitting collateral statement of declarant that was
"neutral on its face" because the "statement that [the declarant] hung around [the defendant] and
company linked him to those involved in the conspiracy").
165. 59 F.3d 341 (2d Cir. 1995).
166. Id. at 350.
167. Id. at 349.
168. Id.
169. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 603 (1994).
170. See United States v. Pabellon, Nos. 98-4060, 98-4088, 1999 WL 305052 (4th Cir. May
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lowing admissible in United States v. Pabellon:
X came to me in March of 1996 and asked me if I knew anyone that
could have Samuel killed. I said no, but I could see. I contacted
Darrell Young and asked Young. Young got back to me in a couple
of months and said he had someone for the job. I went back to X, got
the money, and gave the money to Darrell Young.' 7'
While the trial court substituted "X" for the defendant's name, it is obvi-
ous that the first and last sentences of the statement are collateral and
tend to shift blame away from the declarant. It is someone other than
the declarant who wants Samuel killed. The declarant is merely
facilitating.
The Fourth Circuit cited Williamson only for the proposition that
"[e]ven statements that are on their face neutral may actually be against
the declarant's interest."'' 72 The court continued its analysis by consid-
ering all five sentences as a whole contrary to Williamson.173 It was
noted that at the time the declarant made the statement to the authorities,
he had not yet been implicated in the murder. 174 Further, the declarant
approached the authorities on his own initiative without any offer of
leniency or immunity in exchange for the statement. 175 Thus, the entire
statement was held admissible because "at the time the statement was
made, 'a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have
made the statement unless believing it to be true." 1 76
While the above examples are disturbing enough, other courts have
blatantly ignored Williamson. In United States v. In, the Ninth Circuit
declared hearsay testimony admissible from a declarant who implicated
the defendants in his detailed description of his role in driver's license
fraud in connection with alien smuggling. 177 The court quoted William-
son in stating that "the Supreme Court explained that Rule 804(b)(3)
'does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if
they are made within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpa-
14, 1999); see also United States v. Taylor, Nos. 98-4517, 98-4518, 1999 WL 617896 (4th Cir.
Aug. 16, 1999).
171. Pabellon, 1999 WL 305052 at *7.
172. Id. at *6 (quoting Williamson, 512 U.S. at 603). Yes, this quote is found in Part 1I-B of
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion.
173. Id. at *7.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)). It should be noted that the court did point out in a
footnote that admitting the statement without the first and last sentences presented a problem. To
do so would "make it sound like [the declarant] was admitting he started this, when in essence his
statement definitely implicates someone else as requesting the hit and bringing him the money."
Id. at *7 n.9. The declarant's implication of someone else, however, is exactly what Williamson
was attempting to avoid.
177. Nos. 96-10118, 96-10241, 1997 WL 189310, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 16, 1997).
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tory." ' 17 8 The court then completely ignored Williamson, and admitted
the collateral statements in the same paragraph, reasoning that the
declarant's "own involvement in the driver's license fraud was so inter-
twined with defendant In's involvement, that it would [have been]
impossible to parse out non-self-inculpatory statements."' 7 9 While Wil-
liamson does not directly resolve the issue of unseverable collateral
statements, given its narrow scope, one would think it safer to err on the
side of exclusion. Furthermore, the In court relies on nothing more than
difficulties in parsing out collateral statements to justify their inclusion.
All of these examples show that Williamson has failed in its attempt
to create uniformity. Some courts apply Williamson correctly. 8 ° Yet,
others seem to rebel against it by expanding its breadth,' 81 citing it for
propositions inconsistent with the Court's opinion, 182 and, in some
instances, ignoring it outright.'83 Thus, while Justice Kennedy feared
that the Court's approach in Williamson would eviscerate Rule
804(b)(3), it appears as though it is Williamson that has been eviscer-
ated, when not totally disregarded.
V. CONCLUSION
After reviewing the treatment of Williamson, it becomes clear that
the opinion of the Court has a fatal flaw. What the Court desired to do
was draw a line in the sand, by stating that collateral statements were no
longer going to be admissible under Rule 804(b)(3). Before Williamson,
courts were looking at all of the circumstances surrounding the remarks
against interest to determine their reliability. Using a subjective test
coupled with an abuse of discretion standard of review, however, basi-
cally allowed courts to admit virtually anything. Thus, the Supreme
Court was attempting to take away much of the discretion previously
afforded the lower courts. Indeed, Part I-A of the Williamson opinion
does just that. It leaves a bright line rule that Rule 804(b)(3) "does not
allow admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they are
made within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory."' 84
The Court could have stopped there, but it did not.
For reasons that may never be known, the Court was compelled to
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hazelett, 32
F.3d 1313 (8th Cir. 1994).
181. See United States v. Moses, 148 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Barone, 114
F.3d 1284 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Sasso, 59 F.3d 341 (2d Cir. 1995).
182. See sources cited supra note 170.
183. See United States v. In, Nos. 96-10118, 96-10241, 1997 WL 189310 (9th Cir. Apr. 16,
1997).
184. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600-01.
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write Part II-B, perhaps only to rebut Justice Kennedy's evisceration
argument. In doing so, the Court left the door wide open for abuse. The
simple fact that the Court left the door ajar, however, does not mean that
federal courts should thrust it wide open. Yet that is what is happening.
Furthermore, it seems to be deliberate. For instance, the Eighth Circuit
has been correct in its implementation of Williamson. That circuit was
also more exclusionary in its precedent prior to Williamson. In contrast,
two of the main culprits in the misinterpretation of Williamson are the
First and Second Circuits; both circuits readily admitted collateral, neu-
tral statements prior to Williamson. It seems as though Williamson has
changed nothing. Courts are simply going about business as usual, as if
the Supreme Court never spoke out on the issue.
It appears that lower courts are consciously disregarding a Supreme
Court decision, and ironically the Supreme Court gave the lower courts
the ammunition necessary to do so. Yet, the question that remains is
why. I suggest that the answer is that the Court was defending an
impossible position. The Court was attempting to make a bright line
rule out of an exception that is inherently discretionary.
To see this, one needs only to look at the language of the Rule
804(b)(3). Determining whether a statement "so far tended to subject
[the declarant] to ... criminal liability .... that a reasonable man in his
position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be
true" 185 is an inherently subjective determination. Such determinations
must be made on a case by case basis. Thus, Congress gave trial judges
the discretion to determine the reliability and, therefore, the admissibil-
ity of statements against penal interest. Congress certainly must have
known that, given such discretion, judges could use the exception
liberally.
Justice Kennedy was correct in at least one respect. The rule set
forth in Williamson does eviscerate the statute as it was passed by Con-
gress. Yet in doing so, Justice O'Connor attempted to transform Rule
804(b)(3) into what it was supposed to be: an exception. The problem is
that Justice O'Connor's hypothetical attempted to show that the excep-
tion was not eviscerated and inadvertently provided lower courts with
opportunities to expand the rule.
Hearsay should not be easily admitted. Yet as long as we have an
exception that affords judges broad discretion, those sharing Wigmore's
view will continue to admit impermissible hearsay evidence and the
exception will continue to swallow the rule.
RICHARD T. SAHUC
185. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (emphasis added).
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